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Abstract
We find that compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) has a strong positive
effect on the stability of conventional banks, and a positive but less pronounced effect on
the stability of Islamic banks. We also find that the main impact of compliance is an
increase in capital ratios, whereas other components of the Z-score are negatively
affected. This reflects the desire of banks to be more closely integrated into the
global financial system by holding higher capital ratios. The findings also justify
the 2015 decision of the Islamic Financial Services Board to publish similar
principles for Islamic banks.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we examine whether compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) for
effective banking supervision affects the stability and risk taking of conventional and Islamic
banks. In prior studies, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) and Ayadi et al. (2016) have
examined the effects of BCP compliance using large and heterogeneous samples of conven-
tional banks around the world. In this paper we extend their analyses to include Islamic banks.
We also focus on a more homogeneous sample in the sense that the banks in our study operate
mainly in developing and emerging countries.
The BCPs were introduced in 1997 by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision
(BCBS). Since then, several surveys have been conducted by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank to assess the quality of banking regulation and supervision
worldwide under the Basel principles. The principles were initially created as a pilot project
for 12 advanced countries, but they rapidly became the global standard for banking regulation.
BCPs include 25 principles organised into 7 chapters (i.e., each chapter contains a few of the
25 principles). However, one important drawback of the BCPs is that they do not take into
account the distinctive characteristics of certain types of bank such as Islamic banks.1
In 2015, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB),2 an international regulatory organi-
zation that was created to promote the development and the stability of the Islamic financial
industry, published a set of guidelines called the Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regula-
tion (CPIFRs). These guidelines are built on BCBS standards and have been extended to deal
with the characteristics of Islamic banks.
Within these guidelines, some of the CPIFRs replicate and fully reflect the Basel principles,
some represent amendments to the BCPs, and some CPIFRs are completely new. Because the
CPIFR guidelines were published in 2015, Islamic banks were not expected to implement
them before January 2016 and in many cases even later (IFSB 2015). Thus, data on Islamic
bank compliance with the CPIFRs are not available at this stage. However, since some of the
CPIFRs are similar to conventional bank BCPs, and there are data available on the compliance
of Islamic banks with those principles, our study examines whether the adoption of the BCPs
has affected the stability of Islamic banks. This enables us to make some plausible predictions
about the expected effects of the CPIFRs on the financial soundness of Islamic banks.
To examine these issues, we use a sample of 761 conventional and Islamic banks operating in 19
countries and covering the period from1999 to 2013. In contrast toDemirgüç-Kunt andDetragiache
(2011), our findings suggest that BCP compliance is positively associated with the stability of
conventional banks (at the 1% significance level) and that this holds true for at least five of the seven
1 Islamic banks are by nature financial intermediaries that are compliant with Sharia’a law (Gheeraert 2014).
Thus, they can be defined as institutions that allocate resources and invest them under the guidance of Sharia’a
principles without the use of interest. Islamic banks operate in a highly regulated industry. However, due to the
special characteristics of Islamic banks—i.e. the concept of profit and loss sharing at both the asset side (with
entrepreneurs/borrowers) and the liability side (with depositors/investors)—they not only adhere to the Basel
Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) regulatory guidelines but also to specific capital guidelines by
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial
Institutions (AAOIFI). In this paper, we do not detail the characteristics of Islamic banks because they were
already reviewed extensively in the previous literature. For excellent reviews, the reader may refer to Khan
(2010), Beck et al. (2013), and Abedifar et al. (2013).
2 Established in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2002, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) comprises 188
members, including 61 regulatory authorities, 8 intergovernmental organizations, and 119 market players. The
IFSB is considered to be the complement of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
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chapters that make up the BCP. The effect remains positive but less pronounced for Islamic banks,
where the effects of compliance are positive and significant at the 5 % level or better for three of the
seven chapters. A deeper examination of the components of the main dependent variable (bank Z-
scores) shows that the component of stability most influenced by compliance is the bank capital
ratio. The findings indicate that adherence to international regulatory standards improves the stability
of the two bank types through incentives to hold higher capital ratios. The results hold when
controlling for bank financial characteristics, as well as for the macroeconomic and institutional
environment. The findings also remain invariant (i) across sub-samples representing different
regions, economic cycles, market disciplines, and political and institutional environments, (ii) when
employing alternative measures of risk and stability, (iii) when using an instrumental variables
approach and the Heckman estimation technique to address potential endogeneity and selection
biases, and (iv) when using propensity scorematching (PSM) to reduce any biases due to the limited
sample size.
This study contributes to the literature on both conventional and Islamic banks in at least
three important ways. First, we highlight a strong positive impact of the BCP index on the
stability of conventional banks, while the effect remains positive but somewhat weaker for
Islamic banks. This provides regulatory organizations such as the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) and the IFSB with initial empirical evidence to support the effective role
of BCP standards in improving bank stability. Given that the BCPs are also effective in
improving the stability of Islamic banks, it is likely that the CPFIRs will positively affect the
stability of those banks, as the CPFIRs are modelled closely on the BCPs.
Second, we show that regulatory compliance enhances bank stability through two main
mechanisms: (i) the tendency to make prudent investment decisions, which avoid risky
activities and thereby result in lower but more stable returns on assets; and (ii) the maintenance
of strong insolvency ratios driven by the desire of banks in developing countries to be
recognized and better integrated into the global financial system.
Finally, we add to the comparative literature on conventional and Islamic banks (Abedifar
et al. 2013; Mollah et al. 2017; Bitar et al. 2017; Bitar and Tarazi 2019) by exploring the
regulatory determinants of bank stability and by documenting compelling evidence that the
two bank types respond to similar determinants.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly reviews the literature.
Section III describes the sample, outlines our empirical approach, and provides variable
definitions. Section IV presents the main results, while Section V examines the robustness
of the findings. The last section provides a brief summary and comments on future directions
for the research.
2 Literature Review
The literature examining the effect of banking regulation on the risks to, and the stability of,
the financial system does not employ a consistent set of indicators that can be used as a proxy
for banking regulation. While some studies make use of accounting and market ratios such as
regulatory capital, liquidity, and leverage measures, others use proxies based on questionnaires
and surveys administered by governments and international regulatory organizations. These
studies often report inconclusive and contradictory results.
Barth et al. (2004, 2006, and 2008) were among the first to examine the effect of banking
regulation and supervision on bank performance and stability using international data. Their
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findings suggest that strong monitoring of markets and the private sector is an important factor
in promoting the performance and stability of the financial sector. Focusing on corporate
governance, Leaven and Levine (2009) examine the effects of banking regulation and super-
vision using a variety of proxies (capital requirements, capital stringency, activity restrictions,
and deposit insurance), while also considering bank ownership structure. They conclude that
regulation increases bank risk-taking when a bank has an ultimate owner, while the opposite
occurs when a bank is widely held. Klomp and de Haan (2012) investigate whether banking
regulation has a homogeneous effect on bank risk. Using a sample of 200 banks from 21
OECD countries, their findings show that banking regulation is more effective in improving
safety for riskier banks; i.e., the effect of regulation is not uniform and depends on a bank’s
risk profile. Klomp and de Haan (2014) extend this investigation by examining whether the
association between banking regulation and risk varies with the level of development of a
country’s institutional environment. Using a sample of 400 banks from 70 developing and
emerging countries, their findings indicate that the positive effect of banking regulation and
supervision on risk avoidance is enhanced in countries with a better institutional environment.
More recently, Doumpos et al. (2015) use a large sample of 1700 commercial banks operating in
90 countries over the period 2000–2011 to study the effect of three indices of regulation (central
bank independence, central bank involvement in prudential regulation, and supervisory unification)
on bank stability. Depending on bank size and the country’s official supervisory power, their results
yield a positive and significant association with bank Z-scores, especially during periods of crisis.
Finally, using a sample of 19 EU countries covering the 1999–2011 period, Carretta et al. (2015)
investigate whether the culture of banking supervision (proxied by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions)
affects the stability of banks. Their findings suggest that so-called supervisory cultures, i.e. cultures
based on collectivism and avoidance of uncertainty, are positively correlated with bank Z-scores.
Accordingly, they highlight the importance of cultural dimensions when evaluating the success of
banking regulation by the European Central Bank (ECB).
A serious shortcoming of these studies is that they evaluate the effectiveness of banking
regulation and supervision based on what is claimed in the banks’ books rather than on an
objective assessment of whether, and to what extent, these regulations are actually implement-
ed (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2011; Ayadi et al. 2016). Such an assessment often
reveals a lack of proper implementation, especially in developing countries, so that the
variation across different countries according to the banks’ books may underestimate the true
variation in the execution of banking regulations (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2011).
A small but growing stream of literature utilizes the BCP index to assess the quality of
banking supervision as an alternative to measures based on questionnaires and surveys (as
reported above). Developed by the World Bank and the IMF under the Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), the BCP index is considered a unique source of
information that represents the quality of supervision and regulation in countries around the
globe. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) argue that assessments by the FSAP are
reliable for two reasons: First, the BCP index reflects the actual implementation of the different
elements of banking regulation and supervision. Second, assessments are based on an explicit
and standardized methodology and are conducted by experienced international assessors with
broad country experience.3
3 However, BCP assessments cannot be considered an exact science, as the evaluations might be affected by
several factors depending on the assessors’ subjectivity and experience as well as the existing regulatory
framework (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2011; Ayadi et al. 2016).
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Several studies have employed the BCP index as a proxy measure of regulatory compliance
and have used it to examine the effect of compliance on the performance and stability of the
banking system. Sundararajan et al. (2001) examine the association between BCP compliance
and bank soundness, using a sample of banks in 25 countries. Their findings highlight the
importance of other bank-level and macroeconomic factors and demonstrate that the imple-
mentation of international standards is not sufficient in itself to ensure financial soundness.
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) find that countries that comply with the BCP requirements for
information disclosure receive higher financial strength ratings from Moody’s. In addition,
Podpiera (2006) investigates the effect of BCP compliance on bank performance using a
sample of banks from advanced, emerging, and developing countries. He finds that banks in
countries with higher compliance have lower levels of non-performing loans and lower net
interest margins. In a similar study, Cihak and Tieman (2008) show that BCP compliance is
positively and strongly associated with a country’s level of governance and GDP per capita,
while the effect is less significant when replacing the BCP index with on-the-book regulatory
measures. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) investigate the association between BCP
compliance and financial stability for a sample of international banks. Employing an overall
compliance index, the authors find no evidence of a significant relationship between the index
and the banks’ Z-scores. Finally, Ayadi et al. (2016) extend the work of Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (2011) by focusing on bank efficiency. Their results show no association between
BCP compliance and efficiency. Table 1 summarises the available literature on BCP studies.
Given that the BCPs are designed to promote the stability and financial soundness of
conventional banks, it might be argued that the likelihood of BCP compliance having an effect
on the stability of Islamic banks would be negligible or, at best, relatively slim. This
conclusion is predicated on the assumption that Islamic banks have different balance sheets
and different financial products from conventional banks. However, the literature offers a
variety of opinions on whether or not, in practice, Islamic banks share the same financial
characteristics as conventional banks. The main reason for the differences of opinion is that the
current business models of Islamic banks are inconsistent, such that in some cases there is a
significant disjunction between Sharia’a ideals and bank practices (Khan 2010). One would
expect that under Sharia’a law, Profit Loss Sharing (PLS) instruments such asMusharaka and
Moudharaba (core elements of Islamic banking and finance) would dominate Islamic banking
practices. Yet, surprisingly, non-PLS mark-up modes of finance, such asMurabaha and Ijara,
predominate. Mark-up financing techniques are considered less Sharia’a compliant and are
seen as the hallmark of conventional banking; hence their predominance in the Islamic sector
suggests that the two bank types may in fact be quite similar (Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al.
2013; Bitar and Tarazi 2019).
Recently, the IFSB published new guidelines, the CPIFRs (IFSB 2015), which are based on
the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision. According to the IFSB, the
proposed guidelines aim to “build on the standards adopted by relevant conventional standards
[…] and to adapt or supplement them only to the extent necessary to deal with the specificities
of Islamic finance” (IFSB 2015, p. 2). A detailed description of the CPIFRs is presented in
Table 12.
CPIFR guidelines differ from BCP guidelines in at least three main respects. First, in the
CPIFR framework, investment account holders (IAHs) are treated more like investors than
depositors. This has an impact on capital adequacy ratios, the results of the relevant risk
weighting methodology, the role of regulatory authorities in capital treatment, the bank’s
smoothing behavior, and the bank’s exposure to displaced commercial risk. Second, the rate of
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return (ROR) risk differs in that it depends on market conditions and on competition with
conventional banks. The ROR might lead to the use of bank reserves or to displaced
commercial risk (DCR) if an Islamic bank absorbs any losses (partially or entirely), if reducing
its share of profits yields a shortcoming in the returns payable to IAHs, or through a donation
from the shareholders’ share of income. Finally, the CPIFRs stipulate that Islamic banks must
possess an effective Sharia’a governance system to ensure the compliance of the banks’
activities, investments and products with Islamic law; obviously, the BCP guidelines do not
include this requirement.
As mentioned above, differences between Islamic and conventional banks might influence
the extent to which BCP compliance affects the stability of Islamic banks compared to their
conventional counterparts. While CPIFRs take these differences into account, an empirical
investigation of the effect of CPIFRs on the stability of Islamic banks is not possible at this stage
because CPIFRs have only been introduced recently. We thus substitute compliance with the
BCPs (measured by the BCP index) for CPIFR compliance, and we argue that the BCPs should
have a similar effect to the CPIFRs for two reasons: First, according to the IFSB (2015), seven
principles in the CPIFR guidelines were kept the same as the BCPs, seventeen principles were
amended, and only one principle was replaced. The main difference resides in four new CPIFR
principles related to the characteristics of Islamic banks that were not considered in the BCP
guidelines. Second, given that CPIFR guidelines resemble BCP guidelines, they are likely to
have similar effects on banks with similar characteristics - and the literature suggests that the
two bank types are indeed fairly similar (or at least not very different) in terms of business
orientation (Beck et al. 2013), stability and interest (financing) margins (Abedifar et al. 2013),
profitability (Mollah and Zaman 2015), and capital structure (Bitar and Tarazi 2019).
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Sample Construction
In order to investigate the effect of the Basel Core Principles on the stability and risk
of conventional and Islamic banks, we compile data from three main sources: (1) the
IMF and the World Bank Basel Core Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)
database,4 which contains detailed information on country evaluation of, and compli-
ance with, the BCPs during the period 1999–2012; (2) the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) for macro-
economic and governance variables; and (3) the Bankscope Database provided by
Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings for yearly-based accounting data.
In the selection of bank-level data, we follow the comparative literature on conventional
and Islamic banks (Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013; Bitar and Tarazi 2019) and retrieve
financial information from 1999 to 2013 in 33 countries where both bank types exist. A bank is
excluded from the sample if it does not have at least three continuous observations. In addition,
we remove countries that have data for fewer than 4 banks (Beck et al. 2013). In contrast to
Ayadi et al. (2016), our study focuses on a broad sample of listed and unlisted banks—not just
4 Some assessments are publicly available through the IMF and World Bank websites. The remainder are kept
confidential by the countries’ authorities. In this study, we use a private database provided by the IMF which
contains assessments for all countries. We thank the IMF for sharing these data.
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publicly listed banks—to ensure an adequate representation of Islamic banks, most of which
are unlisted.
We then match bank-level information with country-level information to control for
variations in a country’s macroeconomic and regulatory conditions. After checking the FSAP
database, we find 28 countries that provide information on their compliance with the BCPs and
that are home to both types of bank. We exclude countries such as Algeria, Bosnia, Brunei, the
Cayman Islands, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Senegal, the Sudan, and Yemen because of missing
information on some of the BCP chapters. Our final sample is thus reduced to 651 conven-
tional banks and 110 Islamic banks operating in 19 countries5 and is characterized by the
homogeneity that results from these countries having similar financial characteristics and
macroeconomic conditions. Some of these countries have few Islamic banks while others
have many Islamic banks.
Because the IMF and the World Bank collected data on BCP chapter compliance in three
different waves (1999, 2005 and 2012), our analyses are carried out as follows: (i) the 1999
data are used for the period 1999–2004, (ii) the 2005 data are used for the period 2005–2011,
and (iii) the 2012 data are used for the period 2012–2013. In our sample, countries witnessed
one or two assessment points. For instance, Pakistan only reported its BCP compliance in
2004. Thus, to avoid losing observations, the 2004 data are used for the period 2005–2013.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia reported its BCP compliance in 2004 and 2011. Accordingly, we use
the 2004 data for the period 2004–2010 and the 2011 data for the period 2011–2013.
3.2 Empirical Approach and Definition of Variables
The main dependent variable used to evaluate bank stability is the Z-score and the main
independent variable is the country’s BCP compliance index. We follow Mollah and Zaman
(2015) and Bitar et al. (2016) and use random-effect GLS regressions to examine the effect of
BCP compliance on bank financial stability. We prefer the GLS technique over other
estimation techniques for two reasons: First, regression models such as OLS ignore the panel
structure of our data. Second, our Islamic bank dummy is time-invariant and cannot be
estimated using a fixed-effects methodology. Accordingly, we use the following baseline
regression equations:




 Timet þ εijt ð1Þ
Stabilityijt ¼ αþ β1  Islamici þ β2  BCPjt þ β3  BCPjt  Islamici þ β4
 Bank controlijt−1 þ β5  Country controljt þ ∑
T
t¼1
μt  Timet þ εijt ð2Þ
where Stabilityijt represents the natural logarithm of the Z-score (defined below) of bank i in
country j at time t, and BCPjt denotes the Basel Core Principles compliance index for country j
at time t (if a country has reported its BCP compliance at least once). Bank _ controlijt − 1 is a
5 The sample is dominated by developing countries. Two developed countries are also included: The UK and
Singapore. We include these countries because they have available data on BCP chapters and are markets where
both conventional and Islamic banks operate side by side.
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vector of bank-level control variables. Country _ controljt is a vector of country-level control
variables. Timet represents year fixed effects while εijt is a random disturbance, assumed to be
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, εijt~iid N(0, σ2). In Equation (2),
Islamici is a dummy variable taking on a value of one for Islamic banks and zero for
conventional banks. Finally, an interaction term is introduced between Islamic and BCP to
investigate whether a country’s compliance with the BCP affects the stability of Islamic banks
differently from the stability of their conventional counterparts.
The Z-score is defined as ([return on average assets + equity/assets]/[standard deviation of
the return on average assets]) over the period (t, t–3) (Groeneveld and de Vries 2009; Beck et al.
2013; Abedifar et al. 2013; Mollah et al. 2017). In our regression analysis, we use the natural
logarithm of the Z-score to minimize the effects of higher values, which could represent outliers
(Carretta et al. 2015). In our robustness tests, we follow Bitar et al. (2017) and use loan-loss
reserves to gross loans (LLRGL), loan-loss provisions to total loans (LLPTL), nonperforming
loans to gross loans (NPLGL), and the volatility of the net-interest margin (SDNIM) to examine
the impact of the BCP compliance index on the stability and risk of the two bank types.
Despite the plethora of research on banking regulation and supervision, the BCP
compliance index is rarely used in studies of conventional banking and, to the best of
our knowledge, has never been used in an Islamic banking context. The BCP index is
based on 25 principles that are considered the best measures of compliance with banking
regulation and supervision. These principles are classified into seven chapters as follows:
(Ch. 1) Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision; (Ch. 2) Licensing and Structure;
(Ch. 3) Prudential Regulation and Requirements; (Ch. 4) Methods of Ongoing Supervi-
sion; (Ch. 5) Information Requirements; (Ch. 6) Formal Powers of Supervisors; and (Ch.
7) Cross-Border Banking. Definitions of the different principles used to construct the
seven chapters are provided in Table 13.
We use both an aggregate approach to examine the effect of the overall BCP index and a
disaggregate approach, in which the effect of compliance with individual chapters on bank
stability is examined. Each of the seven chapters that constitute the BCP compliance index is
evaluated based on the following four-point scale: (i) noncompliant; (ii) materially noncom-
pliant; (iii) largely compliant; and (iv) compliant. We grade each chapter by assigning a
numerical value to these ratings (from one for noncompliant to four for compliant). Given
that the compliance index is based on a four-point scale, we thus arrive at a variable that ranges
from 25 (lowest compliance) to 100 (highest compliance).
We further allow for factors that may influence the relationship between BCP compliance and
bank stability by including two vectors, one for bank characteristics and one for country-level
factors. Bank _ controlijt − 1 is a vector that captures bank portfolio characteristics. It includes
measures of bank size proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets (lnta) and by the growth
rate of total assets (gta). We note that the first of these variables may arguably increase or
decrease bank stability and risk (Houston et al. 2010; Beck et al. 2013). The growth-rate measure
reflects any expansion of the bank’s balance sheet during the current year (compared to the
previous year). Abedifar et al. (2013) employ this ratio as a proxy for bank growth and
development strategies. As they expand and develop, banks might be further exposed to
information asymmetry, since a considerable increase in activity may result in weaker screening
standards and lower monitoring of investments. We also include the cost to income ratio (cir) to
capture any cross-bank differences in efficiency, where higher values reflect managerial inad-
equacies (inefficiency) and thus a tendency for banks to take more risk (Abedifar et al. 2013;
Beck et al. 2013). In addition, we use the ratio of noninterest income to total operating income
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(niiti) to reflect a bank’s business model and its tendency towards activity diversification.
Finally, we use the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding (ladstf) to assess
sensitivity to bank runs, because banks with a higher proportion of liquid assets can be expected
to experience lower bankruptcy costs, less information asymmetry, and a greater capacity to
raise equity (Horváth et al. 2014).
Country _ controljt is a vector of five macroeconomic and institutional variables commonly
used in the stability literature (Houston et al. 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2011;
Abedifar et al. 2013; Bitar and Tarazi 2019). It includes the GDP growth rate (gdpg) to reflect
any potential cyclical behavior of the Basel regulation, the inflation rate (inf) to capture a
country’s general financial conditions, and the ratios of oil rent to GDP (oil), gas rent to GDP
(gas), and mineral rent to GDP (mineral)6 as complementary measures of a country’s
economic independence, especially in relation to it being rich or poor in natural resources.
Finally, we employ the World Governance Index (wgi) as an additional measure to control
for the quality of a country’s political and institutional systems. Kaufmann et al. (2010)
compute this index as the average of six governance dimensions (i.e., voice and accountability,
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, and control of corruption).
In our regression estimations, we winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels
to mitigate the effect of outliers. We follow Bitar and Tarazi (2019) and cluster at the
bank level instead of the country level, for two reasons: First, our sample includes
some countries with a much larger number of observations than others. Second,
because we have 19 countries, clustering at a country level might create biased results
(Nichols and Schaffer 2007).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our samples of conventional and Islamic banks. Panels
A and B present the mean, median, and standard deviation for the bank-level dependent and
independent variables, while Panel C presents the summary statistics for the independent
variables (i.e., the BCP compliance index and the seven chapters), and for the macroeconomic
and institutional-environment control variables. Panel D presents the BCP compliance mean
for each country and the corresponding year(s) of assessment.
In Panels A and B, we also report the outcomes of a Wilks’ lambda test (λ),7 a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (Wilc), and a univariate analysis of variance test (F) for
the equality of means for each financial ratio. The results of the statistical tests are
presented in the last three columns of each panel and suggest that conventional banks
are significantly different from Islamic banks with respect to all the financial ratios
(except for the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans). The three tests demonstrate
that the most significant difference between the two bank types relates to the measure
of volatility of net-interest margins (SDNIM), with Islamic banks showing greater
volatility. Finally, we note that the bank types differ significantly on our main
6 Oil, gas, and mineral rents mark the difference between the value of crude oil, gas, and mineral production at
world prices and the total costs of production.
7 Wilks’ lambda is the ratio of the within-group sum of squares to the total sum of squares. It takes on values
between zero and one, with lower values indicating that the ratios are more capable of differentiating between
conventional and Islamic banks.
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dependent variable (the Z-score) with Islamic banks exhibiting a lower degree of
stability; the difference is statistically significant in all three tests.
The mean of the BCP compliance index is 84.95% (Panel C), a much higher value than that
reported by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) and Ayadi et al. (2016). The high
percentage is likely being driven by the inclusion of a large set of banks from emerging and
developing countries. Ayadi et al. (2016) argue that the BCP index is much lower in the United
States and in other developed countries than in developing countries. The high mean BCP
index in this study suggests that banks in developing countries are moving toward global
financial convergence through their compliance with the BCPs and international regulations.
Finally, Panel D presents the number of conventional and Islamic banks in each country. For
conventional banks, the sample is dominated by banks from the United Kingdom, and for
Islamic banks, Bahrain contributes the largest number. We also note that for our sample
period, the number of available observations in Bankscope is relatively low and the percentage
of the number of reported observations (N obs. percent) is higher for conventional (58.4%)
than for Islamic banks (52.1%). In other words, Bankscope provides information for conven-
tional banks in approximately 8.8 out of our 15 sample years, while the coverage for Islamic
banks is 7.8 out of 15 years.
4 Empirical Results
In Table 3, Panel A, we present regression results examining the effect of the BCP index on
bank stability using Equations 1 and 2 after controlling for bank and country-level factors.
Models 1–4 report the results for conventional banks, Models 5–8 report the results for Islamic
banks, and Models 9–12 report the results for the full sample. We also present the results for
the three components of the Z-score for each sample. These components comprise the ratio of
return on average assets (ROAA), the standard deviation of ROAA (SDROAA), and the ratio
of total equity to total assets (TETA). The Wald χ2 (Chi-square) tests are highly significant for
all models, and the R2 values are relatively high, suggesting that the models are representative
and that GLS random-effect regression is indeed an appropriate analysis technique.
We find that the BCP compliance index has a positive and significant effect on the
natural logarithm of the Z-score of conventional banks (at the 1% level), Islamic
banks (at the 5% level), and the full sample (at the 1% level). Economically, the
estimated coefficients on BCP compliance in Models 1, 5, and 9 vary between 0.015
and 0.017, indicating that a one-unit increase in the compliance index is associated
with an increase of nearly two percentage points in the natural logarithm of the Z-
score. In contrast to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011), our results indicate that
the Z-score is higher for conventional and Islamic banks in countries with higher BCP
compliance, suggesting that these countries have sounder institutional settings.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) and Ayadi et al. (2016) used a larger and
more heterogeneous set of banks in countries with different regulatory regimes and
different macroeconomic and institutional conditions; these factors could explain their
failure to detect an effect of BCP compliance. This study focuses mainly on countries
in which the banks all operate within similar financial, economic, and institutional
conditions. In addition, our sample considers banks primarily drawn from developing
countries, whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) and Ayadi et al. (2016)
employ samples that are dominated by banks operating in developed countries.
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To better understand what drives the positive association between BCP compliance and bank
stability, we now focus on the three components of the Z-score. This allows us to examine which
components are most responsive to the effects of BCP compliance: the return on average assets, the
volatility of returns, or bank capitalization. In Table 3, Models 2 and 3 respectively show a negative
impact of BCP compliance on the profits of conventional banks (at the 1% level) and on the
volatility of returns (at the 10% level), while in Model 4, the association with capitalization is
positive and significant (at the 1% level). For Islamic banks, the results are insignificant except in
Model 8, where the association between BCP compliance and bank capital is positive (at the 10%
level). The results for the full sample are similar to those for conventional banks, although the
coefficient estimate for the return on average assets becomes insignificant. Finally, while our
findings for the full sample in Model 9 suggest that BCP compliance has a positive effect on the
stability of conventional banks ([αBCP] is positive and significant), we do not find any significant
impact of BCP compliance on the stability of Islamic banks ([αBCP+αinter], shown in Panel B, is not
statistically significant). Note, however, that in Model 12, BCP compliance has a positive effect on
the capital ratios of Islamic banks at the 5% level.
Together, the findings suggest that the positive association between BCP compliance and the Z-
score of the two bank types is mainly due to the incentive to hold higher capital ratios in a strong
regulatory environment that discourages excessive risk taking; this acts against the generation of
higher profits and earnings volatility. Findings concerning the capital ratio are consistent with the
recent literature on the role of institutional and regulatory factors as determinants of bank capital
decisions. For instance, Bitar and Tarazi (2018) find that creditor protection can play a powerful role
in incentivizing conventional banks to increase their capital ratios.
With regard to bank-level control variables, we find that bank size and Z-scores are negatively
correlated, which is likely due to the negative effect of bank size on capital for both bank types
(Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013). We also find that the growth in total assets is negatively
associated with Z-scores, reflecting weaker screening standards and fewer monitoring incentives as
assets grow. This trend is in line with the fact that regulatory authorities are more flexible with large
banks in terms of capital requirements – a phenomenon that also explains the negative effect of the
growth of total assets on bank capital. The cost to income ratio is negatively associated with bank Z-
scores, suggesting that managerial inadequacies reduce bank profitability and increase risk (Abedifar
et al. 2013; Beck et al. 2013). The effect of bank-level control variables is less pronounced for Islamic
banks, probably due to contradictory signs of the regression coefficient for different components of the
Z-score. For instance, the liquidity ratios have a negative effect on bank profits and a positive effect on
bank capital, resulting in an insignificant effect on the overall Z-score.With respect to the country-level
control variables, we find that banks are more stable in countries with better GDP growth, higher
mineral rents, lower gas rents, and lower inflation.When decomposing theZ-score,we observe that the
positive effect ofGDPgrowth ismainly driven by theROAA (for both conventional banks and the full
sample), while the negative effect of gas rents and inflation is driven by the ROAA for the sample of
conventional banks.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 BCP Index Components
To shed further light on the main results in Table 3, we now examine the impact of the seven chapters
of BCP compliance on bank stability. While Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) and Ayadi et al.
Journal of Financial Services Research
(2016) examine the effect of the seven chapters in a single regression model, in this study, we
separately introduce each chapter and examine its effect on bank stability, while taking account of the
same bank- and country-level control variablesmentioned above. In this way, wemitigate the effect of
multicollinearity between the chapters on bank stability. For comparison purposes, we also report the
effect of all chapters on bank Z-scores in a single regression model.
The results are presented in Table 4 where Panel A contains several important findings. First, the
chapters examined in Models 2–7 all have a positive effect on conventional bank stability (at the
10% level or better). Chapter 2 on licencing and structure and Chapter 7 on cross-border banking
generate the most pronounced effects on the Z-score of conventional banks, while the formal power
of supervisors (Chapter 6) has the least pronounced effect. Overall, six of the seven chapters have a
positive effect on the stability of conventional banks. For Islamic banks, we find positive and
significant associations between the chapters incorporated inModels 10, 12, and 13 and the Z-score.
Chapter 2 on licensing and structure is, again, the chapter that has the most pronounced effect on the
Z-score,whileChapter 5 on information requirements generates the least pronounced effect. Overall,
three of the seven chapters have a positive effect on the stability of Islamic banks. Second, if we
compare the results with those obtained when all chapters are incorporated in a single model (see
Models 8, 16, and 24), the findings become less pronounced for both conventional and Islamic
banks and are similar to those reported by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) and Ayadi et al.
(2016). This supports our reservations regarding the problem of multicollinearity between different
chapters if incorporated into a single model, which may explain the non-significant effect on bank
stability reported in these studies.
Finally, the chapter results for the full sample (Islamic and conventional banks combined)
resemble those reported separately for each type of bank. Specifically, our findings in Table 4,
Models 17–23 continue to suggest that higher BCP compliance has a positive effect on the
stability of conventional banks in Models 18–23 ([αBCP chapters] are positive and significant)
and on the stability of Islamic banks in Models 18, 20, and 21 ([αBCP chapters+αinter], shown in
Panel B, are positive and significant).
5.2 Subsamples
We examine the robustness of the previous results by exploring whether the relationship
between BCP compliance and bank stability changes if we alter the sample composition to (i)
exclude specific regions (namely the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], South East Asia
[SEA], and the Middle East and North Africa [MENA]), (ii) exclude the United Kingdom,
(iii) separately investigate listed and unlisted banks, and (iv) focus on specific periods of the
economic cycle, i.e., the periods before (1999–2006), during (2007–09), and after (2010–13)
the financial crisis. We also examine the effects of excluding groups of countries and banks,
depending on their political stability, institutional environment, and efficiency scores.
The regional subsample results for the conventional, Islamic, and combined groups of banks are
presented in Table 5, Panel A.1. We find that the association between BCP compliance and the Z-
scores of conventional banks is significant and positive, and that this association is robust to the
exclusion of banks in the GCC region, the SEA region, and theMENA region. For Islamic banks, the
association betweenBCP compliance and Z-scores ismarginally positivewhen excluding banks in the
MENA region. However, the results become insignificant when excluding Islamic banks in the GCC
and the SEA regions, suggesting that the positive association is mainly driven by those two regions.
Finally, the results for the full sample do not show any significant impact of BCP compliance on the
stability of Islamic banks ([αBCP+αinter] in Panel A.2 is not statistically significant).
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The 167 conventional banks in the United Kingdom represent some 26% of the entire conven-
tional bank sample. For this reason, we decided to exclude them from the analysis to examine the
possibility that theymight have caused a bias in the pattern of results. Table 5, Panel B.1,Models 1–
3 show that when all UK banks are excluded, the results are positive and significant for the two bank
types. In addition, Panel B.2 suggests that the effect of BCP compliance on the stability of Islamic
banks is positive and significant at the 10% level when excluding Islamic banks from the UK.
Table 4 (continued)
Panel A. The impact of individual BCP chapters on bank stability
Full sample
Variable Z-score









































































































































































































































































Obs. 3238 3325 3177 3034 3325 3225 3215 2886
YFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1227 0.149 0.1439 0.1331 0.1435 0.1216 0.1472 0.1512
χ2 test (p-value) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***





























***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Financial Services Research
Aside from regional and country effects, the association between BCP compliance and bank
stability could be mainly confined to banks that are publicly listed, due to market discipline. Listing a
bank on themarket impliesmore stringent rules and stricter capital regulation and supervision, and thus
less risky behavior. In Panel B.1, Models 4–9 present the results for subsamples of listed and unlisted
banks.We find clear evidence that the effect of BCP compliance on a bank’s Z-score is stronger when
banks are publicly listed, particularly for Islamic banks. We hypothesize that, in contrast to unlisted
Islamic banks, listed banks are more likely to seek international recognition through their compliance
with BCP guidelines and by holding higher capital ratios. Therefore, listed Islamic banks are more
prone to market discipline and regulatory pressure than unlisted ones, which could explain the strong
positive association between BCP compliance and the Z-scores. Confirming the results in Panel B.1,
Panel B.2 shows that the effect of BCP compliance on the stability of Islamic banks is positive and
significant at the 5% level when excluding unlisted Islamic banks.
Table 5, Panel C.1 reports the results for sub-samples classified by the economic period. The
findings provide clear evidence that the association betweenBCP compliance and conventional banks’
stability is stronger for the period that preceded the financial crisis. In other words, the estimated
coefficient on BCP compliance is smallest when the period before the financial crisis is excluded from
the analysis and largest when the period of the crisis itself is excluded (exclusion of the post-crisis
period produces an intermediate value for the coefficient). For Islamic banks, we observe a marginally
positive effect onlywhen excluding the period before the financial crisis. Overall, although the findings
continue to support a positive effect of BCP compliance on the stability of conventional banks and a
marginally positive effect of BCP compliance on the stability of Islamic banks, it appears that
compliance does not preferentially increase bank stability in periods of economic distress. One reason
for this is that our sample mainly covers banks in developing countries and these banks were less
affected by the financial crisis than those in developed economies. Another reason is that some
countries and regions in our sample are rich in natural resources and thus less exposed to economic
turmoil than other countries (Bitar et al. 2016). Finally, the results for the full sample do not show any
significant impact of BCP compliance on the stability of Islamic banks ([αBCP+αinter] in Panel C.2 is
not statistically significant).
We further check the robustness of our findings by studying whether the association
between BCP compliance and bank Z-scores persists in countries with unstable political
systems and weak institutional environments.8 In addition, we examine whether the positive
effect of BCP compliance on bank stability persists for highly efficient banks.9 Table 5, Panel
D.1 indicates that BCP compliance has a negative impact on the stability of conventional and
Islamic banks in countries with weak protection of depositors and an insignificant effect in
countries with less stable political institutions. However, the compliance effect becomes
positive and significant once again for highly efficient banks. Panel D.2 shows that the effect
of the BCP compliance index on the stability of Islamic banks is also negative in countries
with weak protection of depositors. Overall, these results demonstrate that compliance with
BCP is more effective for efficient banks in countries with better institutional environments
and soundly based political systems.
8 We proxy for the stability of a country’s political system by using an index of the durability of political
institutions from the Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions of Polity IV database. We also proxy for
institutional environments by using the creditor rights index from Djankov et al. (2007). We drop banks in
countries with a durability index higher than the median. Likewise, we drop banks in countries with a creditor
rights index that is higher than the median.
9 We proxy for bank efficiency by using bank efficiency scores estimated through data envelopment analysis
(DEA). We drop banks with efficiency scores that are lower than the median.
Journal of Financial Services Research
5.3 Quantile Regressions
Next, we estimate a series of quantile regressions to investigate whether the effect of BCP
compliance on bank Z-scores varies in a significant way with different stability levels. An
important feature of quantile regressions10 is that they allow for heterogeneous solutions that
are conditioned on the level of the dependent variable.
Table 6 reports the results for the lower (Q25), the median (Q50), and the upper (Q75)
quantiles of the Z-score distribution. The results in Panel A show that the estimated coeffi-
cients for the BCP compliance index are positive at all quantiles for the sample of conventional
banks (Models 1–3) and for the full sample (Models 7–9), but not for the sample of Islamic
banks. Moreover, while the coefficients on the Z-score increase somewhat across quantiles, the
Wald tests do not detect any significant differences between the coefficients for the lower
quantile and the upper quantile for either bank type, nor for the combined sample. As for
Islamic banks in the full sample, Panel B suggests a marginally positive effect of the BCP
index on stability for the lower quantile only.
5.4 Alternative Risk Measures
Our previous findings consistently show a positive and pronounced effect of BCP
compliance on the Z-scores for conventional banks, and a positive but less pro-
nounced effect for Islamic banks. We now focus on whether our findings persist
when we re-estimate our regressions using alternative proxies for bank stability. First,
we use three different measures of bank credit risk, namely the ratio of loan loss
reserves to gross loans (LLRGL), the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans
(LLPTL), and the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans (NPLGL). These three
ratios measure loan quality, with higher values indicating poorer supervision and
higher credit default risk (Beck et al. 2013; Abedifar et al. 2013; Bitar et al. 2016).
Second, we use the standard deviation of net interest margins (SDNIM), with higher
values indicating more volatile earning margins.
The results, presented in Table 7, Panel A, show clear evidence of a negative and significant
association between the BCP compliance index and the three proxies of credit risk, as well as
between compliance and the SDNIM. This holds true for the sample of conventional banks in
Models 1–4 and the full sample in Models 9–12, while the results for Islamic banks are only
significant for the SDNIM (Model 8). Economically speaking, the estimated coefficients for
the BCP index in Models 1–3 vary between 0.012 and 0.059, indicating that a one-unit
increase in the compliance index is associated with a decrease in credit risk that ranges
between one percentage point (when using LLPTL) and nearly six percentage points (when
using NPLGL). These results suggest that conventional banks in countries with higher BCP
compliance have lower credit risk and are thus more stable.
To examine the robustness of our main finding, that BCP compliance is positively
associated with the Z-score of conventional and Islamic banks, we further employ a battery
of alternative estimation techniques. The results of these estimations are discussed in the
following sections and confirm our key findings.
10 Quantile regression results are robust to outliers and distributions with heavy tails. In addition, quantile
regressions avoid the restrictive assumption that error terms are identically distributed at all points of the
conditional distribution.
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5.5 Financial Strength Ratings and Distance-to-Default
First, we measure financial stability using financial strength ratings. We use three independent
country risk assessment methods: the Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) credit risk index, the
OECD’s Country Risk Classification (CRC) index, and the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) index. These measures are computed based on the opinion of a global network of
economists and financial analysts who have access to quantitative and qualitative information
about banks and their operating environments. As a result, they should provide a more accurate
assessment of a bank’s overall financial stability than accounting based indicators 11 For the
first two credit rating measures, higher values indicate higher credit default risk, while for the
third credit rating measure, higher values indicate a lower level of exposure to credit risk.
We also use the Distance to Default (D-to-D) measure developed by Moody’s KMV as a
measure of default risk. This index is designed to assess the likelihood of financial distress and is
based on the structural approach to calculating the ExpectedDefault Frequency (EDF). According to
Moody’s, default occurs when the market value of a bank’s assets (i.e., the value of the ongoing
business) falls below its liabilities payable (the default point). See Table 13 for detailed definitions of
the financial strength ratings and the D-to-D measure and for the associated data sources.
The findings reported in Table 8, Panel A, show that the BCP compliance index is positively
associated with the financial strength ratings and negatively associated with the bank D-to-Dmeasure.
This holds for all models except for Model 8, which employs distance to default as a dependent
variable for Islamic banks. In addition, the findings in Panel B show that BCP compliance has a less
pronounced effect on the credit rating measures of Islamic banks, compared to conventional banks (in
Models 9 to 11).
5.6 Other Estimation Techniques
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of the results using three alternative econometric
specifications and standard error estimation methods. Table 9, Panel A provides the results of
regressing the BCP index on banks’ Z-scores. First, we use truncated regressions to address any
biases related to the upper and lower tails of the distribution of observations for the dependent variable.
In the second estimation, we use bootstrapped standard errors from 100 random resamples of the two
bank types employed in the sample. In the third estimation, we correct for heteroscedasticity by using
the White procedure. Importantly, the estimated coefficients of the BCP index are significant and
positive in all models, except for Model 4 which applies truncated regressions to Islamic banks. The
findings in Panel B further suggest that BCP compliance has a significant, positive effect on the Z-
scores of Islamic banks at the 1% level (in Models 8 and 9).
5.7 Propensity Score Matching
Next, we employ the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique proposed by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) to verify the robustness of our results. PSM consists of matching bank
observations based on the probability of increasing the country’s BCP compliance index.
11 Recent papers also used risk assessment provided by rating agencies as an alternative measure of financial
stability. For instance, Vazquez and Federico (2015) use Moody’s bank risk categories as an alternative risk
measure to bank Z-score. Their findings show that credit ratings by rating agencies are important predictors of
bank failure.
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To implement PSM, we create a BCP compliance dummy variable that takes on a value of
one if a country’s BCP compliance index has a value greater than or equal to the median, and
zero otherwise. We then estimate a logit model where we regress the BCP compliance dummy
on all control variables in the baseline model and the year fixed effects. We use the estimated
scores to produce matched observations between countries with higher and lower values of
BCP compliance. Additionally, we employ three different matching methods: K-nearest
neighbors (with n = 10, n = 15, and n = 20 nearest neighbors), Gaussian kernel matching,
and radius matching. In the matched samples (presented in Table 9, Panel C), we continue
to find evidence that conventional banks in countries with higher BCP compliance have higher
Z-scores than matched conventional banks in countries with lower BCP compliance. We
obtain very similar results for banks in the full sample, but the effect is less pronounced for the
sample of Islamic banks. For each matching method, we report t statistics for the differences
between the treated countries, with high BCP compliance, and the countries with low BCP
compliance in the control group. For BCP compliance, the natural logarithm of the Z-score
differences between the treated and control groups vary between 0.123 and 0.288% for
conventional banks, between 0.123 and 0.276% for Islamic banks, and between 0.273 and
0.465% for the full sample. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level in
almost all models, except for the differences in the sample of Islamic banks, which are only
significant when using the radius matching method.
5.8 Additional Control Variables
In this subsection, we address the issue of potential omitted variables. Thus, in addition to bank
level, macroeconomic and institutional control variables, we include a series of four financial
market regulation control variables to further check the robustness of the results.
Following Bitar and Tarazi (2019), we include the concentration ratio (Concentration),
calculated as the ratio of the assets of the three largest banks to the total assets of the banking
sector in the country.12 Second, based on the World Bank’s surveys on Banking Regulation
and Supervision database,13 we use two market regulatory measures: market discipline and
private monitoring (Market discipline) and entry requirements (Bank entry). The first measure
captures the degree to which banks are required to disclose accurate information to the public
and whether there are incentives to increase market discipline and private monitoring. The
second measure controls for entry restrictions in terms of obtaining a banking license. Finally,
we use the Heritage Foundation’s financial freedom index (Financial freedom) to measure the
extent of financial and capital market development as well as the openness to foreign
competition (Bitar et al. 2018).
The findings are consistent with our previous results. As Table 10 shows, the
explanatory variable (the BCP index) and the control variables maintain their signs
and significance as before. As regards the financial market variables, we find that
market discipline and private monitoring, entry requirements, and financial freedom
have a positive and statistically significant effect on the stability of conventional banks,
while the same effect appears to be absent for Islamic banks. In addition, concentration
reduces bank stability. These findings suggest that the better the institutional
12 We also use C5 and recompute C3 and C5 according to the share of bank deposits. The results remain highly
robust.
13 This information is collected based on surveys performed by the World Bank.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Financial Services Research
environment (i.e., superior financial market regulation and increased competition), the
more conducive the situation is to banking stability.
5.9 Addressing Endogeneity and Selection Biases
A country’s BCP index could be endogenous, reflecting the impact of some omitted variables
(e.g., market concentration, market regulation, financial freedom) or the impact of reverse
causality. The findings in the previous sections demonstrate that the results are robust to the
inclusion of additional control variables. Thus, we now address concerns about reverse
causality. A common undertaking in the literature (e.g., Barth et al. 2013; Bitar and Tarazi
2019) is to address endogeneity by employing the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. Thus,
we use this approach and select four instruments chosen on the basis of the existing literature
on law and finance (Beck et al. 2003; Barth et al. 2009; Barth et al. 2013; Öztekin 2015).
These studies argue that legal origins and business regulation have important effects on
banking regulation and are exogenous. However, a potential concern with using these two
instruments is that they might affect bank capital decisions through channels other than the
BCP index. We use two approaches to address this issue. Firstly, rather than employing legal
origins and business regulation by themselves as instruments, we employ them along with two
additional instruments: ethnic fractionalization and the (log) number of years that the country
has been independent. The literature shows that these two instruments are less likely to have a
direct impact on bank capital stability or some other omitted variable (Öztekin 2015).
Additionally, while we instrument for the country’s BCP index with legal origins and business
regulation (along with ethnic fractionalization and independence), we control for the legal
origins and business regulation in the second-stage regression.
The results are reported in Table 11, Models 1 and 2 for conventional banks, Models 4 and
5 for Islamic banks, and Models 7 and 8 for the full sample. We use two estimation techniques,
a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) and a generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimation. The results provide clear evidence of a positive and significant association (at the
1% level) between the BCP compliance index and the Z-score in all models. For the full
sample, the results in Panels A and B suggest that BCP compliance has a positive and
significant effect on the stability of conventional banks (αBCP is positive and significant).
The same effect is observed in the case of Islamic banks ([αBCP+αinter] is positive and
significant), but it is less pronounced.
In addition, we use a Heckman (1979) selection approach to mitigate concerns about a
potential self-selection bias. The main objective of this technique is to correct for a self-
selection bias based on whether or not countries are highly compliant with the Basel Core
Principles. As a first step we define a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the value
of a country’s BCP compliance index is greater than or equal to the median, and zero
otherwise. We then estimate a probit model that regresses the dummy variable on the two
instruments used before (i.e., rule of law and business regulation), as well as on the bank- and
country-level control variables and the year-fixed effect from the baseline model. In the
second-stage regression, we consider the natural logarithm of the Z-score as the dependent
variable, the BCP compliance index as the independent variable (in addition to the same control
variables), and the self-selection parameter (measured as the inverse Mills ratio) estimated from
the first-stage regression. The findings of the second-stage regression (presented in Table 11,
Panels A and B, Models 5, 10, and 15) continue to suggest that both conventional and Islamic
banks are more stable in countries with a higher BCP compliance index.
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6 Concluding Remarks
While previous studies that used the BCP index found no evidence of a significant
association with bank stability and efficiency, this study suggests a positive effect of
BCP compliance on the stability of banks in 19 countries. The findings are robust
when the effects are examined separately for individual chapters of the BCPs. The
association between compliance and stability is more pronounced for conventional
than for Islamic banks. A deeper investigation into the components of the dependent
variable (the Z-score) shows that the impact of compliance is confined mainly to the
capital ratios of the two bank types.
Our findings have important implications from a regulatory perspective. Because compli-
ance with the BCPs is effective in improving the stability of Islamic banks, it is likely that
compliance with the CPFIRs can also positively affect Islamic bank stability, as they are
modelled closely on the BCPs. Our findings persist across a battery of robustness checks that
address potentially omitted variables, endogeneity concerns, and selection biases, and which
also employ alternative estimation techniques. This first empirical assessment of Islamic banks
shows that the BCPs are less effective at increasing the stability of Islamic banks than
conventional banks. This difference leaves the open question of whether BCP standards
should be amended to accommodate some of the specificities of Islamic banks, rather than
having two separate sets of guidelines. One argument in support of a unified set of
regulations is that it would lead to a more stable financial system in countries where the
two bank types operate in tandem.
It is worth noting that the import of our results depend largely on the sample size,
the choice of countries, and the validity of the accounting measures used as proxies for
bank stability. Whilst increasing the sample size is beyond the potential of our study,
since it would require additional surveys by the IMF and the World Bank, we attempt
to overcome potential limitations related to measurement errors by using a wide range
of proxies and econometric techniques. A next step in our analysis would be to explore
the effect of the CPIFRs on the stability of Islamic banks and to compare it with the
effect of the BCPs. In addition, it would be important to identify which BCP and
CPIFR chapters are responsible for any significant effect on bank stability; in this
context, the CPIFR chapters that reflect the specificities of Islamic banks will warrant
particular attention. Unfortunately, data allowing for a comparative assessment of the
two sets of guidelines are not currently available but will hopefully be incorporated into
future research on this topic. Similarly, one could attempt to investigate whether the
BCP and CPIFR guidelines have the same effect on Islamic bank efficiency by
employing scores derived from nonparametric approaches or by using additional
market-based data on stock returns and Tobin’s Q, for instance. While the IFSB has
asked banks to start reporting their data on the CPIFRs as of January 2016, the data are
unlikely to be available before the end of 2018, which corresponds to a period outside
the scope of this paper.
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Appendix
Table 12 Comparison between BCP chapters and CPIFR chapters
Organization IMF and World Bank Basel Core Principles
(BCPs)
IFSB Core Principles for Islamic Finance
Regulation (CPIFR)
Program Basel Core Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP)
Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation
Working Group (CPIFRWG)
Starting date 1999 January 2016 or later
Objective To promote the stability and soundness of the
financial sector, and to assess its potential
contribution to growth and development.
To provide a set of core principles for regulation
and supervision, taking into consideration the
specificities of Islamic banks and
complementing the BCP compliance standards.
Principle 1 Objectives, independence, powers, and
transparency
Retained unchanged
Principle 2 Permissible activities Clear definition of licensed Islamic banks’
permissible activities that are subject to
supervision by regulatory authorities.
Principle 3 Licensing criteria Retained unchanged
Principle 4 Transfer of significant ownership Retained unchanged
Principle 5 Major acquisitions The regulatory authority has the power to
approve or reject, and impose more prudential
requirements on major acquisitions, against
prescribed criteria, including the establishment
of cross-border operations, and to determine
that corporate affiliations or structures do not
expose the bank to undue risks or hinder ef-
fective supervision.
Principle 6 Capital adequacy Regulatory capital should be compliant with
Sharia’a law. Accordingly, regulatory
authorities require Islamic banks to adopt an
appropriate capital adequacy approach by
considering the particularities of Islamic banks
(the extent of risk-sharing between bank share-
holders (bank capital) and IAHs (depositors)).
Principle 7 Risk management process Regulatory authorities require Islamic banks to
establish a comprehensive risk management
process, including an effective board of
directors and senior management, appropriate
steps to comply with Sharia’a law, and the
development of contingency arrangements.
This process depends on the Islamic banks’ risk
profile and their systemic importance.
Principle 8 Credit risk Regulatory authorities require Islamic banks to
create an adequate credit risk management
process (taking into account a bank’s risk
appetite, its risk profile, and market and
macroeconomic conditions) that covers the full
credit lifecycle including credit underwriting,
credit evaluation, and the management of
Islamic banks’ financing and investment
portfolios on a timely basis.
Principle 9 Problem assets, provisions and reserves Islamic banks should implement adequate
policies to identify assets at risk early-on and to
maintain an adequate amount of provisions and
reserves.
Principle 10 Large exposure limits Regulatory authorities determine whether
Islamic banks have adequate policies to
identify, measure, and control concentrations of
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Table 12 (continued)
risk. Regulators also set prudential limits to
restrict bank exposures to single counterparties
or groups of connected counterparties.
Principle 11 Exposures to related parties To prevent the risk of conflict of interest with
related parties, the supervisory authority
requires Islamic banks to monitor transactions
with these parties, to take appropriate steps to
control or mitigate the risks, and to write off
exposures in accordance with standard policies
and processes.
Principle 12 Country and transfer risks Retained unchanged
Principle 13 Market risk Regulatory authorities determine whether
Islamic banks have adequate market risk
management (taking into account a bank’s risk
appetite, its risk profile, and market and
macroeconomic conditions) to identify,
measure, and control market risk on a timely
basis.
Principle 14 Liquidity risk Regulatory authorities provide the appropriate
liquidity instruments for the needs of Islamic
banks. These authorities also determine whether
Islamic banks have adequate liquidity risk
management (taking into account a bank’s risk
appetite, its risk profile, and market and
macroeconomic conditions) to identify,
measure, and control liquidity risk on a timely
basis.
Principle 15 Operational risk Regulatory authorities determine whether
Islamic banks have an adequate operational risk
management framework (taking into account a
bank’s risk appetite, its risk profile, and market
and macroeconomic conditions) to identify,
measure, and control operational risk on a
timely basis.
Principle 16 Interest rates in the banking book Rate of return risk instead of interest rates in the
banking book. Regulatory authorities determine
whether Islamic banks have an adequate system
(taking into account a bank’s risk appetite, its
risk profile, and market and macroeconomic
conditions) to identify, measure, and control
rate of return risk on a timely basis. Regulators
can also assess the capacity of an Islamic bank
to manage the rate of return risk and any
resultant displaced commercial risk, and to
obtain sufficient information to assess the
behavior of IAHs and their maturity profiles.
Principle 17 Internal control and audit Regulatory authorities determine whether
Islamic banks have adequate internal control
frameworks to establish and maintain a
properly controlled operating environment for
the conduction of their business taking into
account their risk profile.
Principle 18 Abuse of financial services Retained unchanged
Principle 19 Supervisory approach Retained unchanged
Principle 20 Supervisory techniques Regulatory authorities employ adequate
instruments to implement their supervisory
approach taking into account the risk profile
and systemic importance of an Islamic bank.
Principle 21 Supervisory reporting
Journal of Financial Services Research
Table 12 (continued)
The supervisory authority collects, reviews, and
analyzes prudential reports and statistical
returns from Islamic banks on both a solo and a
consolidated basis, and independently verifies
these reports through either on-site examina-
tions or the use of external experts.
Principle 22 Accounting and disclosure Retained unchanged
Principle 23 Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors Regulatory authorities possess a range of tools
to take corrective actions at an early stage to
address unsafe practices or activities that could
pose risks to an Islamic bank or to the banking
system, i.e., the ability to revoke a banking
license or to recommend its revocation.
Principle 24 Consolidated supervision Regulatory authorities supervise the banking
group on a consolidated basis; they adequately
monitor and apply prudential standards to all
aspects of the business conducted by the
banking group worldwide.
Principle 25 Home-host relationships Home and host regulatory authorities of
cross-border banking groups share information
and cooperate for effective supervision of the
group and group entities. Supervisory authori-
ties require the local operations of foreign Is-
lamic banks to be conducted to the same
standards as those required of a domestic Is-
lamic bank.
Principle 26 Not applicable Treatment of Investment Account Holders
(IAHs). The regulatory authorities determine
how IAHs are treated and also determine the
various implications (including the regulatory
treatment, governance and disclosures, and
capital adequacy and associated
risk-absorbency features, etc.) relating to IAHs
within their jurisdiction.
Principle 27 Not applicable Sharia’a governance framework. Regulatory
authorities determine whether Islamic banks
have a robust Sharia’a governance system to
ensure an effective independent oversight of
Sharia’a compliance over various structures
and processes within the organizational
framework. The Sharia’a governance structure
adopted by an institution offering Islamic
financial services is commensurate and
proportionate with the size, complexity, and
nature of its business. The supervisory authority
also determines the general approach to
Sharia’a governance in its jurisdiction, and lays
down key elements of the process.
Principle 28 Not applicable Equity investment risk. Regulatory authorities
satisfy themselves through adequate policies
and procedures including appropriate strategies,
risk management and reporting processes for
equity investment risk management, including
Muḍarabah and Musharakah investments in
the banking book (i.e., financing on a
profit-and-loss sharing basis), taking into ac-
count Islamic banks’ appetite and tolerance for
risk. In addition, the supervisory authority
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ensures that Islamic banks: have in place ap-
propriate and consistent valuation methodolo-
gies; define and establish the exit strategies in
respect of their equity investment activities; and
have sufficient capital when engaging in equity
investment activities.
Principle 29 Not applicable Islamic “windows” operations. Supervisory
authorities define what forms of Islamic
“windows” are permitted in their jurisdictions.
The supervisory authorities review Islamic
windows’ operations within their supervisory
review process using the existing supervisory
tools. The supervisory authorities in
jurisdictions where windows are present satisfy
themselves that the institutions offering such
windows have the internal systems, procedures
and controls to provide reasonable assurance
that: (i) the transactions and dealings of the
windows are in compliance with Sharia’a rules
and principles; (ii) appropriate risk management
policies and practices are followed; (iii) Islamic
and non-Islamic business are properly segre-
gated; and (iv) the institution provides adequate
disclosures for its window operations.
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Variable Definition Data sources
Z-score A measure of bank insolvency calculated as the
natural logarithm of ((ROAA+TETA)/SDROAA),
where ROAA is the return on average assets, TETA
represents the equity to assets ratio and SDROAA
stands for the standard deviation of the return on
average assets.
Authors’ calculations
AROAA A measure of risk-adjusted return on average assets.
It is calculated as the return on average assets
(ROAA) divided by the standard deviation of
ROAA.
Authors’ calculations
LLRGL Bank reserves for loan losses divided by gross loans,
multiplied by 100
Authors’ calculations
LLPTL Bank provisions for loan losses divided by total
loans, multiplied by 100
Authors’ calculations
NPLGL Bank non-performing loans divided by gross loans,
multiplied by 100
Authors’ calculations
SDNIM The standard deviation of the net interest margin for
a three-year period
Authors’ calculations
lnta The natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope
gta The current year growth rate of bank total assets
compared with the previous year’s total assets.
Bankscope
cir The ratio of bank costs to bank income before
provisions, multiplied by 100
Bankscope
niiti Bank noninterest income to bank total operating
income, multiplied by 100
Authors’ calculations
ladstf The ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term
funding. It measures and assesses the sensitivity to
bank runs; therefore, it promotes financial soundness
but it can also be interpreted as excess liquidity
coverage.
Bankscope
BCP index An overall index of BCP compliance. The index
takes on values between 25 and 100, with higher
values suggesting greater compliance with the BCPs.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
Chapter 1 This variable is the normalized sum of the rates of
compliance with the sub-principles of principle 1
and measures the extent to which the preconditions
for effective banking supervision have been met:
1(1): There should be clear responsibilities and ob-
jectives set by legislation for each supervisory
agency; 1(2): Each supervisory agency should pos-
sess adequate resources to meet the objective set,
provided that they do not undermine the autonomy,
integrity, and independence of the supervisory
agency; 1(3): There should be a suitable framework
of banking laws setting bank minimum standards,
including provisions related to the authorization of
banking establishments and their supervision; 1(4):
The legal framework should provide the power to
address compliance with laws as well as safety and
soundness concerns; 1(5): The legal framework
should provide protection of supervisors for actions
taken in good faith in the course of performing
supervisory duties; and 1(6): There should be ar-
rangements for interagency cooperation, including
with foreign supervisors, for sharing information and
protecting the confidentiality of such information.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
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Variable Definition Data sources
The variable takes on values between 25 and 100,
with higher values indicating better adherence to
these preconditions.
Chapter 2 This variable is the normalized sum of the rates of
compliance with principles 2–5; 2: Definition of
permissible activities; 3: Right to set licensing
criteria and reject applications for establishments that
do not meet the standards set; 4: Authority to review
and reject proposals for significant ownership
changes; and 5: Authority to establish criteria for
reviewing major acquisitions or investments. The
variable takes on values between 25 and 100, with
higher values indicating greater power of supervisors
to approve a license and influence the structure of the
new banking entity.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
Chapter 3 This variable measures the prudence and
appropriateness of the minimum capital adequacy
requirements that supervisors set. The variable is the
normalized sum of the rates of compliance with
principles 6–15: 6: Prudent and appropriate
risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratios must be set; 7:
Supervisors should evaluate banks’ credit policies; 8:
Banks should adhere to adequate loan evaluation and
loan-loss provisioning policies; 9: Supervisors
should set limits to restrict large exposures, and
concentration in bank portfolios should be identifi-
able; 10: Supervisors must have in place require-
ments to mitigate the risks associated with related
lending; 11: Policies must be in place to identify,
monitor, and control country risks, and to maintain
reserves against such risks; 12: Systems must be in
place to accurately measure, monitor, and adequately
control markets risks, and supervisors should have
powers to impose limits or capital charge on such
exposures; 13: Banks must have in place a compre-
hensive risk management process to identify,
measure, monitor, and control all other material risks
and, if needed, hold capital against such risks; 14:
Banks should have internal control and audit sys-
tems in place; and 15: Adequate policies, practices,
and procedures should be in place to promote high
ethical and professional standards and prevent a
bank being used by criminal elements. The variable
takes on values between 25 and 100, with higher
values indicating a greater compliance to the mini-
mum capital requirements.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
Chapter 4 This variable measures the extent of ongoing
supervision. The variable is calculated as the
normalized sum of the rates of compliance with
principles 16–20: 16: An effective supervisory
system should consist of on-site and off-site super-
vision; 17: Supervisors should have regular contact
with bank management; 18: Supervisors must have
the means of collecting, reviewing, and analyzing
prudential reports and statistics from banks on a solo
and consolidated basis; 19: Supervisors must have a
means of independent validation of supervisory
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
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Variable Definition Data sources
information, either through on-site examinations or
the use of external auditors; and 20: Supervisors
must have the ability to supervise banking groups on
a consolidated basis. The variable takes on values
between 25 and 100, with higher values suggesting
higher levels of on-going supervision.
Chapter 5 A measure of the required extent of a bank’s internal
financial records. This variable is the normalized rate
of compliance with principle 21: Each bank must
maintain adequate records that enable the supervisor
to obtain a true and fair view of the financial
condition of the bank, and must publish on a regular
basis financial statements that fairly reflect its
condition. The variable takes on values between 25
and 100, with higher values suggesting more
stringent requirements for information disclosure.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
Chapter 6 A measure of the formal powers of supervisors,
calculated as the normalized rate of compliance with
principle 22: Adequate supervisory measures must
be in place to bring about corrective action when
banks fail to meet prudential requirements, when
there are regulatory violations, or when depositors
are threatened in any other way. This should include
the ability to revoke the banking license or
recommend its revocation. The variable takes on
values between 25 and 100, with higher values
indicating greater supervisory powers.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
Chapter 7 This variable measures the extent to which
supervisors apply global consolidated supervision
over internationally active banks. The variable is
calculated as the normalized sum of the rates of
compliance with principles 23–25: 23: Supervisors
must practice global consolidated supervision over
internationally active banks, and must adequately
monitor and apply prudential norms to all aspects of
the business conducted by these banks; 24:
Consolidated supervision should include
establishing contacts and information exchanges
with the various supervisors involved, primarily the
host country supervisory authorities; 25: Supervisors
must require the local operations of foreign banks to
be conducted with the same standards as those
required of domestic institutions, and must have
powers to share information needed by the home
country supervisors of those banks. The variable
takes on values between 25 and 100, with higher
values suggesting a stronger movement towards
global consolidated supervision.
IMF/World Bank Basel Core Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) da-
tabase
wgi The world governance index is the average of six
governance dimensions including: (1) voice and
accountability, (2) political stability and absence of
violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regula-
tory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of
corruption (see Kaufmann et al. (2010) for details).
World governance indicators database
(The World Bank and Kaufmann et al.
(2010))
gdpg Growth rate of GDP World Development Indicators (WDI)
inf World Development Indicators (WDI)
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Variable Definition Data sources
Inflation rate, based on changes in the consumer
price index
oil Oil rents are the difference between the value of
crude oil production at world prices and the total
costs of production.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
gas Natural gas rents are the difference between the value
of natural gas production at world prices and the total
costs of production.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
mineral Mineral rents are the difference between the value of
production for a stock of minerals (tin, gold, lead,
zinc, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate)
at world prices and the total costs of production.
World Development Indicators (WDI)
EIU credit risk
index
The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) credit risk
index assesses the risk of cross-border transactions
such as bank loans, trade finance and investment
securities. Used by the credit risk departments of
commercial banks, this index is the average of six
country risk categories: (1) sovereign risk, (2) cur-
rency risk, (3) sovereign debt risk, (4) banking sector
risk, (5) political risk, and (5) economic structure
risk. The credit risk index scores range between 0
and 100 with higher values indicating greater credit
risk exposure.
The Economist – Economic Intelligence
Unit
CRC index The Country Risk Classification (CRC) index mea-
sures the country credit risk and the likelihood that a
country will repay its external debt. The index re-
flects transfer and convertibility risk as well as cases
of force majeure. It ranges between 0 and 7 with
higher values indicating greater credit risk exposure.
www.OECD.org website - Country Risk
Classification
ICRG index The international Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index
assesses three subcategories of risk: (1) political risk,
(2) financial risk, and (3) economic risk. Used by
banks and multinational corporations, the ICRG in-
dex determines how financial, economic, and politi-
cal risk might affect their business and investments
now and in the future. The ICRG index ranges
between 0 and 100 with higher values indicating less
risk exposure.
www.prsgroup.com website – Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide
D-to-D The Moody’s KMV distance to default is based on
the Expected Default Frequency and is a measure of
the probability that a bank will default over a specific
period of time (typically one year). There are three
key values that determine a bank’s EDF credit
measure: (1) the current market value of the bank
(market value of assets), (2) the level of the bank’s
obligations (default point), and (3) the vulnerability
of the market value to changes (assets volatility).




Concentration of the three biggest banks in a country




Market discipline and private monitoring is an
indicator of disclosure of adequate information to the
market. It ranges from 0 to 9 and is calculated by
responding to the following 9 questions (1 if the
answer is yes and 0 otherwise except for questions 8
and 9 where the opposite occurs): (1) Is subordinated
debt allowed (or required) as capital? (2) Are
Banking Regulation and Supervision
database, World Bank, and authors’
calculations
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Table 13 (continued)
Variable Definition Data sources
financial institutions required to produce consolidat-
ed accounts covering all bank and any non-bank
financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance-sheet
items disclosed to the public? (4) Must banks dis-
close their risk-management procedures? (5) Are
directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading in-
formation? (6) Do regulations require credit ratings
for commercial banks? (7) Is an external audit by a
certified/licensed auditor mandatory for banks? (8)
Does accrued, unpaid interest/principal on
non-performing loans appear on the income state-




This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al.
(2000, 2003, 2008, see details therein). The variable
increases by 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1–8
of their survey, with no increase if the answer is no.
The variable addresses 8 questions with higher
values indicating stricter entry requirements: Re-
garding the legal submissions required for a banking
license: (1) Is the legal submission drafted by-laws?
(2) Does the legal submission require an intended
organization chart? (3) Does the legal submission
require first 3-year financial projections? (4) Does
the legal submission require financial information on
shareholders? (5) Does the legal submission require
background/experience of future directors? (6) Does
the legal submission require background/experience
of future managers? (7) Does the legal submission
require sources of funds in capitalization of the new
bank? (8) Does the legal submission require infor-
mation on the intended market differentiation of the
new bank?
Banking Regulation and Supervision




The financial freedom index measures the efficiency
of the overall banking system. It examines a broad
category of indicators, including the extent of
financial and market development, the extent of
government regulation of financial services, and
openness to foreign competition. The index varies
between 0 and 100 with higher values indicating
better economic and financial conditions.
Heritage Foundation
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